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Abstract 
The Great Recession (the fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter of 2009) has been characterized by 
high rates of foreclosures and unemployment. Using a sample of community reinvestment loans, we examine 
the impact of structural unemployment and cyclical unemployment on mortgage terminations (default and 
prepayment). We find that mortgage default and prepayment are more sensitive to changes in the structural 
component of the local unemployment rate than in the cyclical component. In addition, depending on whether 
structural unemployment rates are high or low, borrowers and lenders react differently to the incentives to 
terminate a loan. 
Introduction 
The Great Recession and its slow recovery changed in the first quarter of 2009 from one driven by the boom and 
bust of the subprime mortgage market to one driven by worsening employment conditions. Since employment 
(with its associated income stream) is a precondition for most households to meet their financial obligations, a 
weak labor market should increase mortgage delinquency and terminations. The unemployment rate has often 
been used as a proxy for adverse trigger events or negative income shocks. Not surprisingly, the unemployment 
rate has indeed been found to be positively associated with mortgage delinquency (Campbell and 
Dietrich 1983). Job loss can also force a household to move to a cheaper house or to become a renter. However, 
there is little empirical evidence to support this impact (Clapp et al. 2001). In general, empirical evidence 
indicates that job loss, as proxied by the unemployment rate, makes it more difficult to refinance existing 
mortgage debt, thus suppressing mortgage prepayments and refinances (Campbell and Dietrich 1983; Deng et 
al. 2000; Clapp et al. 2001, and An et al. 2010). 
The relationship between the unemployment rate and default is less clear cut. For example, some papers find 
that higher rates of unemployment are associated with elevated rates of default and foreclosure (Capozza et 
al. 1997; Elmer and Seelig 1999, and Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010). Deng et al. (2000) find that the state 
unemployment rate is positively associated with mortgage default risk for the United States, however, for some 
key states such as California and Texas no statistically significant result is found. Other empirical studies do not 
find a relationship between default and unemployment rates (Clapp et al. 2001; Pennington-Cross and 
Chomsisengphet 2007, and An et al. 2010, and Ghent and Kudlyak 2011). 
Why does the unemployment rate have the expected impact in some empirical studies but not in others? In this 
study, we examine the relationship between the local unemployment rate and mortgage terminations from a 
novel perspective. We contend that differences in unemployment rate across different locations and time 
periods may reflect different types of unemployment and that these different types may have differential 
impacts on the ability of borrowers to make timely mortgage payments or cure delinquent mortgages. 
Within business cycle theory, the unemployment rate can be viewed as a combination of a structural 
component and a cyclical component. Unemployment caused by long term mismatches between labor supply 
and demand is often referred to as structural unemployment while cyclical unemployment is associated with 
temporary labor market conditions. Those two components may have distinct patterns of movement and 
statistical properties (Mocan 1999), and thus, their impacts on mortgage performance may differ as well. 
Depending on how long a homeowner expects to be unemployed, the incentives to avoid mortgage delinquency 
and default should also differ. For example, expectations of a short duration of unemployment might inspire the 
homeowner to avoid foreclosure by accessing other financial assets (such as savings or assistance from other 
family members). In contrast, if the spell of unemployment is expected to be very long, then these assets may be 
better used to cover the costs of moving to a location with superior labor market conditions or covering other 
consumer or financial needs (for example, food and transportation costs). In addition, the response of the 
lender/servicer likely will vary depending on perceptions of the length of the unemployment spell. From a policy 
and macro perspective, understanding the role of structural and cyclical unemployment on mortgage 
terminations should provide valuable insights to develop more effective intervention programs. 
If structural and cyclical local unemployment rates have distinct impacts on borrower behavior, the impact of 
the observed unemployment rate on mortgage default and prepayment reflects the combination of these two 
components. As a result, we explore the relationship between mortgage performance (mortgage default and 
prepayment) and different measures of unemployment using a sample of loans originated under auspices of 
Community Reinvestment Act between 1991 and 2007. More narrowly, we use the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) 
decomposition (Beveridge and Nelson 1981) and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) 
approaches to decompose the cyclical and structural components of local unemployment rates. We find that 
structural unemployment is a more important determinant of mortgage terminations than cyclical 
unemployment. Mortgages are most sensitive to changes in structural unemployment defined by the HP filter. 
Predictions about future foreclosures that rely, even in part, on observed unemployment rates are likely to 
differ depending on the magnitude of the cyclical and structural components in each locality. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section discusses the business cycle and the 
unemployment decomposition alternatives, followed by a description of the empirical strategy and the data. 
Finally, the empirical findings and their implications are presented. 
Unemployment and the Business Cycle 
A seasonally adjusted time series 𝑦𝑦 can be viewed as the combination of a structural component and a cyclical 
component as follows 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡  (1) 
Where c is the cyclical component (this can be also referred to as the transitory, temporary, or short term 
component) and τ is the structural component (this can be also referred to as the trend, permanent, or long 
term component). Numerous approaches have been proposed to separate the cyclical component and the 
structural component in Eq. (1) (for a review, see Ozyildirim and Zarnowitz 2006) including the unobserved 
component approach (Harvey 1985), the BN decomposition, the HP filter, and the Band-pass filter (Baxter and 
King 1999). 
These approaches are based on a number of assumptions about features of the structural and cyclical 
components that can lead to different decomposition results. For example, as applied to unemployment, the 
estimated structural component using the BN decomposition is often much closer to observed unemployment 
than that estimated using the HP filter. This is because the BN decomposition assumes correlated structural and 
cyclical components while the HP filter imposes a smooth shape on the structural unemployment rate. Another 
example is in the difference between the BN decomposition and the unobserved component approach. The 
unobserved component approach proposed by Harvey imposes a zero correlation between the structural 
component and cyclical component. Morley et al. (2003) and Sinclair (2009) introduce correlation in the 
structural models. 
The least empirically complicated decomposition technique is the linear deterministic trend approach. However, 
this approach is not theoretically or empirically sound when the series is not stationary (Stock and 
Watson 1988). The existence of a unit root process indicates that a series is not stationary. Many tests have 
been designed to detect unit roots in time series including Dickey and Fuller (1981), Perron and Phillips (1988), 
and Perron (1989). We perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the unemployment rates between 1990 
and 2009 for 540 different counties in the US. The results show the US unemployment rate is an I(1) process 
(unit root in the level but not in the first difference).Footnote1 Among the 540 counties examined, test statistics 
reject a unit root process at the 10 % level for only 12 counties. The same tests reject a unit root process of the 
first difference of unemployment rates for 534 counties. These results, combined with the fact that the test 
statistic is sensitive to de-trending techniques, indicates that it is necessary to examine decomposition 
techniques that do not require a series to be stationary. Hence, this paper uses the BN decomposition and the 
HP filter as two alternative de-trending techniques. The BN decomposition requires a series to be stationary in 
the difference and the HP filter does not require the series to be stationary. This dual approach allows us to see 
how sensitive the mortgage results are these imbedded assumptions in HP and BN. 
BN Decomposition 
The first difference of the non-stationary series y in Eq. (1) is w. w is stationary and it can be expressed as 
follows 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯ (2) 
Where μ is the expectation of w and ε t is the uncorrelated disturbance term. Beveridge and Nelson (1981) show 
that the structural component can be expressed as: 
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦 + (∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖∞1 )𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 + (∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖∞2 )𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯ (3) 
and the cyclical component , c t , is (∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖∞1 )𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 + (∑ 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖∞2 )𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−1 + ⋯ 
HP Filter 




{� 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡 + 𝜅𝜅� [(𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡−1) − (𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡−2)]
2
𝑡𝑡 } (4) 
Where κ determines how smooth the time series of τ t is and larger values of κ correspond to more smooth time 
series. Compared to BN decomposition and some other decomposition procedures, the HP filter is relatively 
straightforward to implement. It is widely used for decomposing structural and cyclical components 
(Mocan 1999). 
Empirical Strategy and Data 
To examine the relationship between local unemployment rates and loan performance, we estimate a 
competing risk approach and follow the empirical strategy used by Deng et al. (2000), McCall (1996), and 
Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010). 
Survival and Hazard Specification 
Under the competing risk framework, loan default and prepayment are jointly modeled while addressing the 
data censoring issue. The estimation relies on the construction of the hazard and the survival functions, which 
are introduced as follows. 
Let λ ri be the hazard rate of default (r = D) or prepayment (r = P) for loan i. The hazard is specified as: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃) = exp (𝜆𝜆0𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)∗𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 + 𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟) (5) 
where λ r0 is the baseline hazard, X i (t) is a matrix of risk determinants that may or may not vary over 
time t, β r are the risk determinate parameters to be estimated, and θ r are the heterogeneity parameters to be 
estimated which are assumed to be independent of observed characteristics. The prepayment and default 
events are assumed to be independent and the corresponding survival function S i is defined as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃)
= exp (−∫  𝑡𝑡
0
[𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷(𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃)]𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠) (6) 
The log likelihood, LL, is expressed in discrete time assuming risk determinants are constant within each time 
interval. 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = ∑  𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 log 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃) + ∑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 log 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷,𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃) (7) 
The baseline hazard is estimated using local regression, as motivated by Cleveland (1979) and others, to smooth 
the Kaplan-Meier hazards of prepayment and default. Let n t be the population at time t and n rt be the number 
of termination events of type r at time t. The Kaplan-Meier hazard for time t and termination type r is n rt /n t . 
The smoothing parameters are set to maximize the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), 0.32 for default and 0.27 
for prepayment. Default is defined as the first month with an observed 90-day delinquency on a mortgage and 
prepayment as the month in which the loan is paid off prematurely. The specification of heterogeneity mass 
point p m for group m, is defined in a logistic transformation to bound the probabilities between zero and one. 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚 =
𝑢𝑢𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚
∑  𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢𝑞𝑞𝑚𝑚
 (8) 
where q m  ∈ (−∞, + ∞) and q 1 is normalized to 0 . 
Local Unemployment Rate and Decomposition 
Local area unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide unemployment information for each 
county and each series is seasonally adjusted using the Census X11 method. 
The implementation of BN decomposition follows Newbold (1990). Assume that w t in Eq. (2) follows an 
ARMA(p, q) process and let ϕ 1 through ϕ p be the AR parameters. Let 𝑤𝑤
^
𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) be the forecast of w j at time t, 
and 𝑤𝑤 is the mean of the forecast. The cyclical component is defined as follows: 
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We need to determine a forecasting process for each of the 540 counties covered in the data. Since we are 
trying to find patterns for over 500 series, we rely on the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) or Schwarz criteria 
to determine the Auto-Regressive and Moving Average (ARMA) process. Each series allows for up to ARMA(4,4) 
with the default being AR(1).Footnote3 The Schwarz criteria tend to select lower order ARMA processes. One 
hundred twenty-nine counties are determined to be ARMA(1,0) during the sample period. 
The BN decomposition may be sensitive to the potentially less precise forecasting mentioned above as well as 
the extreme value in �1 − ∑  𝑝𝑝1 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖�
−1
 in Eq. (9). This leads to unreasonable estimates of cyclical and structural 
components around 2009 when unemployment rate reached its historic high during the sample period. As a 
result, we revise the forecasting process of those counties to ARMA(1,0). 
Since the analysis is done at the monthly frequency, the smoothing parameter for the HP filter is set to be 
129,600 following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).Footnote4 Given that the HP components estimated in the past are 
affected each time the data is extended, we create a separate measure based on the HP structural component 
ranking for a robustness check. Each month we rank counties according to the HP structural component from 
low rate to high. The higher the ranking (or “score”), the higher the relative HP structural component is. We 
then sum the ranking of all months within our sample period. Therefore, the final “score,” or HP Ranking Score 
(HPRS), can be interpreted as a measure of how consistently the HP structural component is higher than that in 
other counties. 
The relationship between the business cycle, local unemployment, and loan performance is examined in a later 
section in a series of experiments. Using the default and prepayment hazards coefficient estimates, probabilities 
are simulated to investigate the response to changes in the observed and structural components of the local 
unemployment rate. 
Community Reinvestment Loans 
The data for the analysis come from a national sample of community reinvestment loans.Footnote5 The database 
contains information on approximately 46,000 loans originated to low- or moderate-income families that reside 
in low-income areas, minority areas regardless of family income, or any minority borrower regardless of income 
or location. 
The analysis sample includes 30-year fixed rate home purchase loans originated in 1991 or later, excluding 
manufactured homes. Over 22,000 loans in 540 counties throughout the country have complete loan and 
borrower information. The hazard analysis is performed on a monthly basis for loan history (loan age) up to 
120 months. 
Table 1 includes a list of the explanatory variables and their definitions.Footnote6 The variables are grouped into 
those only observed at origination and those observed repeatedly over the life of the loan. The borrower annual 
income normalized by the area median income (inc_ami) is used to test whether the relative income of the 
household makes it more susceptible to default or prepayment. However, low income in itself should not affect 
the probability of a loan prepay or default because it does not directly affect the value of the option to 
terminate the loan or the extent to which it is “in the money” to do so. The financial incentives should be driven 
by interest rates and home values. However, low income likely functions as a proxy for unobserved education, 
mobility, wealth, and transaction costs. Therefore, we anticipate that higher income will be associated with a 
lower probability of default and a higher probability of prepayment. Monthly mortgage debt payments 
normalized by borrower monthly income (debt to income ratio or dti) is also included. We expect that 
households with larger debt burdens will be more likely to default and prepay because they will be more 
susceptible to unobserved trigger events that could cause a loan to terminate such as divorce, health events, or 
job loss. Through a similar logic, a higher borrower credit score at origination (fico) is expected to decrease the 
probability of default and increase the probability of prepayment. Moreover, borrowers who have not paid their 
prior debt obligations are also less likely to pay their current and future debt obligations. At the same time, poor 
credit history will also make it more difficult for a borrower to find alternative mortgage financing in the event of 
a move or a decline in interest rates. 
Table 1 Variable definitions and summary statistics 




inc_ami   0.589 0.158 Annual income divided by area medium income at loan 
origination. 
 
dti   0.275 0.074 The fraction of combined income that goes toward 
mortgage payments or front-end ratio.  
fico   678 64 Borrower's credit score at loan origination 
  Loans   22,538    
Varies within 
each loan 
default   0.010 0.003 The first 90-day delinquency on a mortgage. 
 
prepay   0.003 0.001 A mortgage is paid off prematurely.  
cltv   0.788 0.150 Current loan amount divided by estimated house value.  
cltv12   0.760 0.140 One year forecast of cltv.  
refi   0.055 0.078 Percentage reduction in present value of future payments 
if refinance into the market rate as a fraction.  
refi12   0.062 0.073 One year forecast of refi.  
unempr Observed 5.430 1.814 County level unemployment rate (percent).  
  Cyclical HP 0.001 0.994 Cyclical component of "Level" measured by HP filter.  
  Cyclical BN 0.006 0.193 Cyclical component of "Level" measured by BN 
decomposition.  
  Structural 
HP 
5.429 1.530 Structural component of "Level" measured by HP filter. 
 
  Structural 
BN 
5.436 1.841 Structural component of "Level" measured by BN 
decomposition.  
  HPRS 62147 29999 Sum of county unemployment ranking by structural HP.  
ndecl   0.850 2.638 Number of months house price has continuous decline  
varmrate 1.5E-05 1.1E-05 24-month forward-looking 




varhpi   2.2E-05 4.1E-05 24-month forward-looking variance of quarterly percent 
change in MSA level house price index by Federal Housing 
Finance Agency. 
 
dsrts   113 61 Total Days since Foreclosure Referral to Sale, Cutts and 
Merrill (2008)  
loan age  45 28 Months 
  Observations  968,561    
default and prepayment are the monthly hazard rates. HPRS sums the unemployment rate (Structural HP) county ranking for each month. The higher the 
individual ranking, the higher the Structural HP unemployment rate is that month. Different interest rates are tested for estimating refi and the results 
are robust to specifications. Missing values in variables lead to different sample sizes for different specifications. Sample size of the baseline specification 
is reported here and estimates for common variables are robust as shown later 
 
A high loan-to-value ratio is associated with higher probabilities of default (Kau et al. 1994). cltv is estimated 
using the outstanding balance on the loan and an estimate of current house value generated through Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s metropolitan area house price index. A borrower’s decision to terminate a loan is also 
influenced by expectations of future house prices, interest rates, and the length or cost of defaulting. We 
include three variables that will be discussed later in greater detail: a forecast of the future loan-to-value ratio 
(cltv12), a forecast of the future net present value percentage gain on a refinance (refi12), and a measure of 
number of days from the start of foreclosure proceedings to the day the property is referred for sale (fdays). 
Following Deng et al. (2000), a measure of the net present value gain from refinancing a fixed rate mortgage 
(refi) is constructed as follows. At time t, the gain from refinancing is the percentage reduction in the discounted 
value of all future mortgage payments if the borrower refinances, PV r , versus if the borrower continues to hold 












Where j = c, r, RMT is the remaining mortgage term in months, d t ,is the discount rate measured by the 30-year 





where i ct is the market 30-year fixed mortgage interest rate at mortgage originationFootnote7 at time t and i rt is the 
market 30-year fixed mortgage interest rate at time t. We expect prepayment hazards to increase with refi, as 
defined in Eqs. 10 through 12. 
We also include future interest and house price volatility measures, under the assumption that consumer 
expectations are rational and correctly forecast volatility. Interest rate volatility (varmrate) is the moving 
variance of future 24-month 30-year fixed-rate conventional mortgage rates and house price volatility (varhpi) is 
measured by the moving variance of future 24-month metropolitan area HPI. We expect that more volatility in 
interest rates will reduce refinance probabilities since borrowers may wait for interest rates to decline even 
further. Similarly, house price volatility increases the value of delaying default (Kau and Kim 1994 and Kau and 
Keenan 1995).To capture the effect of house price trends the number of months that house prices have been in 
decline (ndecl) is also included. This variable may capture how households and lender think about prices in the 
future and therefore affect the value of delay and the desire to move or refinance. 
County unemployment rates are included to capture labor market conditions. Consistent with prior work, higher 
county unemployment rates indicate a higher probability that borrowers have lost their jobs or have a lower 
income stream, making it more difficult to make mortgage payments. Unemployment may also increase the use 
of “distressed” prepayments, but it also makes it harder to meet underwriting requirements to 
refinance.Footnote8 To investigate the different roles of long run vs. short run local unemployment on mortgage 
terminations, we include different measures of cyclical and structural unemployment (observed, BN and HP 
cyclical and structural components). The average observed county unemployment rate is approximately 
5.4 %.Footnote9 Given the distressed nature of labor market it may be tempting to think that mortgage defaults 
may contribute to unemployment. Our empirical tests use individual loan data. The employment status of an 
individual should have an undetectable impact on unemployment rates; therefore, unemployment rates can be 
treated as exogenous to mortgage status. 
Finally, we control for the impact of local foreclosure laws by including the average number of days from the 
start of foreclosure proceedings to the day when the property is referred for sale (fdays) in each state. Cutts and 
Merrill (2008) estimate this number using Freddie Mac data. It can serve as a proxy for the amount of “free rent” 
that a household can expect to gain during the foreclosure process and the cost of foreclosure that the 
lender/investor will bear in the event of a default. Due to the interaction of the lender and borrower the 
direction of the impact is an open empirical question. 
Estimation Results 
Our first set empirical specifications for competing risk, proportional hazard, with heterogeneity model include 
risk determinants standard in the literature.Footnote10 Most of the estimates have signs consistent with 
expectations and are statistically significant. Borrower income relative to the metropolitan area median, credit 
score at origination, current loan-to-value ratio, and local unemployment rate are all strong indicators of default 
and prepayment probabilities. Higher income and credit scores (the prior ability to pay financial obligations in a 
timely fashion) are negatively associated with default and positively associated with prepayment. Higher cltv is 
associated with higher default and lower prepayment probabilities. The variable refi is also a positive indicator 
for both default and prepayment. It is unclear why higher interest rates should drive up default probabilities in 
fixed rate loans; perhaps higher rates make competing household debt more costly, so that homeowners have a 
harder time paying the mortgage. As expected, we find that volatility in interest rates (varmrate) delays 
prepayment. However, we do not find that volatility in house prices (varhpi) delays default. 
Berkovec et al. (1998), Calem and Wachter (1999), and Deng and Gabriel (2006) find that the debt-to-income 
ratio (dti) has little impact on mortgage termination. In contrast, we find a strong link between front-end ratio 
and prepayment. However, after controlling for income, the debt-to-income ratio is generally insignificant in the 
default equations. 
All local unemployment rate measures (unempr) other than the HP cyclical component are positively associated 
with default and negatively associated with prepayment.Footnote11 The HP cyclical component does not influence 
mortgage default significantly. The HP and BN cyclical components have a relatively small impact on mortgage 
terminations compared to the structural components. These results provide evidence that long run 
unemployment measures are a more important determinant of mortgage termination than cyclical 
unemployment. 
Loan Termination Behavior and the Economic Environment 
To better understand the link between mortgage terminations and the structural component and cyclical 
component of unemployment rates, we interact different measures of local unemployment with other 
explanatory variables in Tables 2 and 3.Footnote12 




     Structural 
components 
   
 
 
  Observed  HP  BN  HP  BN  HPRS  












inc_ami −0.355*** 0.089 −0.266*** 0.094 −0.265*** 0.092 −0.355*** 0.097 −0.358*** 0.089 −0.144 0.112 
dti −0.096 0.090 −0.014 0.091 0.040 0.091 −0.163 0.101 −0.088 0.090 0.124 0.111 
fico −1.066*** 0.088 −1.039*** 0.087 −0.781*** 0.083 −0.815*** 0.102 −1.077*** 0.086 −0.960*** 0.098 
cltv 0.505*** 0.085 0.832*** 0.087 0.570*** 0.085 0.357*** 0.094 0.503*** 0.083 0.276** 0.112 
unempr 0.300*** 0.023 0.076*** 0.026 0.036 0.022 0.324*** 0.024 0.303*** 0.023 0.168*** 0.026 
varmrate −0.211** 0.084 0.402*** 0.082 0.033 0.082 −0.164** 0.081 −0.207** 0.085 −0.418*** 0.096 
varhpi 0.086 0.059 −0.015 0.049 −0.101 0.080 0.062 0.083 0.078 0.058 0.391*** 0.095 
unempr_inc_ami 0.031* 0.017 0.014 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.030 0.019 0.032* 0.017 −0.009 0.023 
unempr_dti 0.025 0.017 0.007 0.019 −0.003 0.020 0.039* 0.020 0.024 0.017 −0.018 0.023 
unempr_fico 0.063*** 0.019 0.063*** 0.018 0.008 0.018 −0.001 0.021 0.066*** 0.018 0.051** 0.020 
unempr_cltv 0.006 0.016 −0.059*** 0.018 −0.005 0.019 0.040** 0.018 0.006 0.016 0.061*** 0.023 
unempr_varmrate 0.049*** 0.017 −0.107*** 0.019 −0.019 0.018 0.023 0.015 0.049*** 0.017 0.074*** 0.020 
unempr_varhpi −0.007 0.009 0.021** 0.009 0.045*** 0.017 −0.009 0.013 −0.006 0.009 −0.064*** 0.020 
loc1 −1.208*** 0.117 −0.251** 0.127 −1.121*** 0.209 −1.333*** 0.118 −1.172*** 0.118 −1.645*** 0.211 
loc2 −2.868*** 0.458 −1.475*** 0.289 0.031 0.113 −5.373*** 0.963 −2.637*** 0.298 −0.668*** 0.130 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0   
q2 0.038 0.171 0.148 0.168 −0.366*** 0.119 −0.276*** 0.101 0.278** 0.141 −0.133 0.130 
Loans 22,538  22,538  22,538  22,538  22,538  22,538  
Obs 968,561  968,561  968,561  968,561  968,561  968,561  
Loglike −79,257  −79,401  −79,226  −79,071  −79,014  −79,439  
*indicates significance at 90 %, ** indicates significance at 95 %, and *** indicates significance at 99 %. loc1 and loc2 are shift parameters of the two 
heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized to zero. All unemployment 
variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction terms) are scaled to mean 0 
and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical component, its HP structural 
component, its BN structural component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with Table 3. 
 

































inc_ami 0.172*** 0.056 0.140*** 0.054 0.352*** 0.054 0.270*** 0.059 0.199*** 0.057 0.288*** 0.063 
dti 0.165*** 0.056 0.030 0.055 0.275*** 0.055 0.285*** 0.061 0.167*** 0.057 0.063 0.062 
fico 0.017 0.052 0.013 0.050 0.259*** 0.047 0.141*** 0.055 −0.001 0.053 0.268*** 0.058 
cltv 0.117** 0.050 −0.153*** 0.048 −0.218*** 0.050 0.164*** 0.053 0.083* 0.050 −0.206*** 0.060 
refi 0.543*** 0.061 0.368*** 0.060 0.492*** 0.062 0.651*** 0.063 0.574*** 0.062 0.665*** 0.060 
unempr −0.128*** 0.014 0.078*** 0.013 −0.026** 0.012 −0.245*** 0.014 −0.151*** 0.014 −0.047*** 0.013 
varmrate −0.427*** 0.055 −0.296*** 0.049 −0.207*** 0.057 −0.388*** 0.055 −0.309*** 0.058 0.044 0.053 
varhpi 0.302*** 0.046 0.042 0.035 0.166*** 0.059 0.444*** 0.050 0.251*** 0.046 0.018 0.058 
unempr_inc_ami 0.039*** 0.012 0.043*** 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.035*** 0.012 0.014 0.013 
unempr_dti 0.013 0.012 0.040*** 0.011 −0.012 0.012 −0.017 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.035*** 0.013 
unempr_fico 0.050*** 0.011 0.046*** 0.010 −0.004 0.010 0.022* 0.012 0.054*** 0.011 −0.008 0.013 
unempr_cltv −0.072*** 0.010 −0.023** 0.010 −0.014 0.011 −0.078*** 0.011 −0.070*** 0.011 −0.011 0.012 
unempr_refi −0.028** 0.014 −0.007 0.013 −0.005 0.014 −0.060*** 0.014 −0.016 0.014 −0.063*** 0.013 
unempr_varmrate 0.051*** 0.012 0.033*** 0.011 0.023 0.012 0.045*** 0.012 0.040*** 0.013 −0.050*** 0.012 
unempr_varhpi −0.059*** 0.010 −0.008 0.007 −0.042* 0.013 −0.080*** 0.010 −0.051*** 0.010 −0.004 0.012 
loc1 −0.352*** 0.128 −1.324*** 0.127 0.763*** 0.068 0.433*** 0.081 −0.437*** 0.126 0.965*** 0.080 
loc2 1.354*** 0.092 0.371*** 0.092 −1.153*** 0.116 1.880*** 0.070 1.353*** 0.080 −0.840*** 0.112 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0   
q2 0.038 0.171 0.148 0.168 −0.366*** 0.119 −0.276*** 0.101 0.278* 0.141 −0.133 0.130 
Loans 22,538  22,538  22,538  22,538  22,538  22,538  
Obs 968,561  968,561  968,561  968,561  968,561  968,561  
Loglike −79,257  −79,401  −79,226  −79,071  −79,014  −79,439  
* indicates significance at 90 %, ** indicates significance at 95 %, and *** indicates significance at 99 %. loc1 and loc2 are shift parameters of the two 
heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized to zero. All unemployment 
variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction terms) are scaled to mean 0 
and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical component, its HP structural 
component, its BN structural component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with Table 2 
 
 
Again, most of the single variable estimates have signs consistent with expectations and are statistically 
significant. For default, the interaction results are most consistent for the credit score (unempr_fico) and the 
equity position (unempr_cltv) interactions. Default and prepayment are more sensitivity to credit scores at 
origination in areas with higher contemporaneous unemployment rates (measured by observed, cyclical, and 
structural components). We perform a number of simulations to demonstrate the impact of changes in the 
economic environment characterized by different unemployment measures. The hazards are simulated at the 
37th month (around the first peaks of defaults) with all other characteristics evaluated at their means. We 
compare roughly one standard deviation above and below the mean of local unemployment and set the two 
comparison points at 4 % and 8 % for the observed and structural component and at −1 and 1 % unemployment 
rate for the cyclical component. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the interaction between various measures of unemployment and the equity position of the 
borrower (current LTV). Higher cltv is associated with a higher probability of default regardless of the economic 
condition. However, the magnitude of the impact might change. Figure 1 shows that changes in cyclical 
unemployment have little impact on the borrower behavior. On the other hand, higher levels of the structural 
component (HP Structural) increase the sensitivity of default to the equity position as illustrated in Figure 2. In 
summary, borrowers use the default option more aggressively when structural unemployment is high. 
 
Fig. 1 Default, Cyclical HP Unemployment, and Current LTV. Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with 
sample mean characteristics (other than local unemployment rate and current loan-to-value ratio). Both series 
use “Cyclical HP” equation parameter estimates in Table 2. Loan age is set to 37th month. Unemployment rates 
are chosen for approximately one standard devaiton below and above the mean. More specifically, mean - s.d. = 
−1 % and mean + s.d. = 1 % 
 
Fig. 2 Default, HP Structural Unemployment, and Current LTV. Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with 
sample mean characteristics (other than local unemployment rate and current loan-to-value ratio). Both series 
use “Structural HP” equation parameter estimates in Table 2. Loan age is set to 37th month. Unemployment 
rates are chosen for approximately one standard devaiton below and above the mean. More specifically, mean - 
s.d. = 4 % and mean + s.d. = 8 % 
 
In terms of prepayment, the interactions are most consistent for the option proxy, refi, and borrower credit 
scores, fico. In addition, the structural components tend to dominate the cyclical components of unemployment. 
Locations with high rates of structural unemployment, whether measured by HP or BN, are also more sensitive 
to borrower credit history. In general, higher credit score borrowers are more likely to refinance or prepay the 
loan. When structural unemployment is high the relative difference between high and low credit score 
prepayment propensities is increased. However, a higher rate of structural unemployment depresses the 
responsiveness of borrowers to changes in interest rates. Therefore, when labor market conditions are 
structurally weak, credit history becomes even more important for maintaining access to credit markets and 
borrowers are less able to refinance existing debt when interest rates decline. 
The Role of Expectations 
Next, we examine the impact of borrower expectations on mortgage terminations. We test four variables: a 12-
month forecast of future loan-to-value ratio (cltv12), a 12-month forecast of the future percentage gain on 
refinance (refi12), the number of months house prices have been declining (ndecl) and a measure of the number 
of days between a foreclosure referral and its referrer for sale in each state (fdays). The variable fdays is a proxy 
of the lenders costs of foreclosure and is largely determined by state regulations. It also proxies for how much 
“free rent” a delinquent borrower can gain while making no further mortgage payments. 
The variable cltv12 is defined as the ratio of the estimated outstanding loan balance to the expected house value 
12 months from the date of each observation.Footnote13 The outstanding loan balance is estimated according to 
the fixed rate amortization schedule for each loan and each period assuming the borrower stays current for the 
next 12 months. The expected house value is generated based on the metropolitan area house price index. A 
forecasting rule is generated on the stationary series and then forecasts of house value 12 months from the 
current period are generated for each loan and month.Footnote14 Similarly, the variable refi12 is generated based 
on a forecast of the market interest rate and remaining balance following the procedure described in Eqs. (10) 
to (12). 
The estimates are presented in Tables 4 and 5. In the default model, we see cltv12 is generally statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, borrowers do not seem more or less likely to default if the equity position is expected to 
increase or decrease. On the other hand, expectations of worsening equity positions deter refinancing and 
prepayment even more regardless of the specification. If prices have declined for a longer time in the past, 
refinances are deterred even more, after controlling for interest rates and future equity positions. Similar to the 
forward looking equity position, the backward looking price path (ndecl) does not have any consistently 
significant impact on default probabilities. 






BN  HPRS 
 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami −0.201*** 0.024 −0.198*** 0.024 −0.202*** 0.024 −0.191*** 0.023 
dti 0.043* 0.023 0.047** 0.023 0.043* 0.023 0.049** 0.022 
fico −0.805*** 0.027 −0.846*** 0.024 −0.805*** 0.027 −0.766*** 0.026 
cltv 0.496*** 0.034 0.506*** 0.041 0.497*** 0.034 0.445*** 0.035 
cltv12 0.013 0.035 −0.007 0.041 0.014 0.035 0.073** 0.035 
observed 0.242*** 0.021             
cyclical     −0.009 0.021 −0.011 0.018     
structural     0.358*** 0.023 0.244*** 0.021 0.160*** 0.021 
ndecl −0.010 0.022 −0.033 0.022 −0.011 0.022 0.045** 0.020 
varmrate 0.020 0.021 −0.049** 0.023 0.020 0.021 −0.070*** 0.020 
varhpi 0.054*** 0.018 0.004 0.020 0.055*** 0.018 0.071*** 0.017 
fdays 0.011 0.022 −0.027 0.023 0.012 0.022 0.003 0.021 
loc1 −1.810*** 0.403 −2.714*** 0.655 −1.820*** 0.406 −1.181*** 0.245 
loc2 0.253*** 0.046 0.258*** 0.068 0.252*** 0.046 0.240*** 0.047 
q1 0   0   0   0   
q2 −0.121 0.145 0.040 0.188 −0.118 0.145 −0.257* 0.152 
Loans 21,315  21,315  21,315  21,315  
Obs 936,828  936,828  936,828  936,828  
Loglike −74,683  −74,487  −74,681  −74,751  
* indicates significance at 90 %, ** indicates significance at 95 %, and *** indicates significance at 
99 %. loc1 and loc2 are shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation 
parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled 
to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction terms) are 
scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. These specifications are jointly estimated with Table 5 
Table 5 Prepayment results with expectations 




BN  HPRS 
 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami 0.348*** 0.014 0.320*** 0.013 0.348*** 0.014 0.349*** 0.014 
dti 0.184*** 0.014 0.168*** 0.013 0.184*** 0.014 0.184*** 0.014 
fico 0.287*** 0.013 0.260*** 0.012 0.287*** 0.013 0.272*** 0.013 
cltv −0.161*** 0.035 −0.152*** 0.033 −0.162*** 0.035 −0.133*** 0.035 
cltv12 −0.078** 0.034 −0.068** 0.033 −0.077** 0.034 −0.129*** 0.034 
refi 0.479*** 0.051 0.480*** 0.051 0.479*** 0.051 0.509*** 0.051 
refi12 0.045 0.051 −0.063 0.051 0.045 0.051 −0.021 0.051 
observed −0.151*** 0.013             
cyclical     0.134*** 0.014 −0.002 0.011     
structural     −0.277*** 0.013 −0.151*** 0.013 −0.115*** 0.013 
ndecl −0.089*** 0.015 −0.076*** 0.015 −0.088*** 0.015 −0.129*** 0.015 
varmrate −0.105*** 0.013 −0.056*** 0.013 −0.104*** 0.013 −0.067*** 0.013 
varhpi 0.014 0.012 0.065*** 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012 
fdays 0.138*** 0.014 0.151*** 0.013 0.137*** 0.014 0.144*** 0.014 
loc1 0.628*** 0.051 0.518*** 0.053 0.629*** 0.051 0.587*** 0.051 
loc2 −1.064*** 0.097 −0.754*** 0.096 −1.061*** 0.097 −1.150*** 0.109 
q1 0   0   0   0   
q2 −0.121 0.145 0.040 0.188 −0.118 0.145 −0.257* 0.152 
Loans 21,315  21,315  21,315  21,315  
Obs 936,828  936,828  936,828  936,828  
Loglike −74,683  −74,487  −74,681  −74,751  
* indicates significance at 90 %, ** indicates significance at 95 %, and *** indicates significance at 
99 %. loc1 and loc2 are shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation 
parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled 
to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction terms) are 
scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. These specifications are jointly estimated with Table 4 
 
Expectations of future interest rates had no additional impact on refinancing activity or prepayment. This result 
may indicate that borrowers are willing to exercise the prepayment option whenever it is in the money and the 
costs of refinancing may have become so low that there is little incentive for borrowers to wait for lower 
interest rates in the future. 
Finally, we find that expectations about lender costs and borrower benefits, captured with foreclosure days 
(fdays), do not influence the default decisions. These higher costs, however, do seem to make prepayment a 
more attractive option. Long foreclosure proceedings may give defaulting households enough time to find a 
buyer for the home; or, by increasing the cost of default, incentivize lenders/investors to accept short sales (a 
sale of the property to extinguish the debt even if the proceeds do not cover the outstanding debt and fees). 
In summary, most of the forward looking variables tend to have an impact of prepayment but not on defaults. 
Serious Delinquency vs. Short-Term Delinquency 
Finally, we conduct a preliminary investigation of short-term or 30-day delinquency patterns. We estimate a 
specification similar to the one presented in Table 4. The new default results are presented in Table 6. We focus 
our discussion on two variables: unempr and fdays. Higher local unemployment increases the propensities of 30-
day delinquency. This is especially true for structural unemployment. We also find HP cyclical component also 
increases the 30-day delinquency propensity. Higher expected lender costs/borrower benefits (fdays) are 
associated with a higher incidence of short-term delinquency but are not associated with serious delinquency 
(default). This provides suggestive evidence that borrowers are aware of how long a foreclosure takes. In states 
where the foreclosure timeline is very long, borrowers should be less worried about losing the home and are 
more willing to be temporarily delinquent on their mortgage. In contrast, the foreclosure timeline has no impact 
on serious delinquency (default). 






BN  HPRS 
 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami −0.112*** 0.023 −0.123*** 0.026 −0.113*** 0.023 −0.119*** 0.022 
dti 0.102*** 0.022 0.121*** 0.028 0.101*** 0.022 0.084*** 0.021 
fico −0.839*** 0.022 −0.957*** 0.024 −0.839*** 0.022 −0.814*** 0.021 
cltv 0.246*** 0.049 0.174*** 0.054 0.246*** 0.049 0.168*** 0.054 
cltv12 −0.136*** 0.044 −0.083* 0.046 −0.136*** 0.044 0.039 0.048 
observed 0.493*** 0.017             
cyclical     0.042** 0.019 −0.019 0.014     
structural     0.728*** 0.025 0.499*** 0.018 0.132*** 0.020 
ndecl 0.216*** 0.014 0.177*** 0.014 0.212*** 0.015 0.320*** 0.017 
varmrate 0.015 0.019 −0.098*** 0.021 0.016 0.019 −0.210*** 0.018 
varhpi 0.013 0.015 −0.080*** 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.074*** 0.015 
fdays 0.059*** 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.061*** 0.021 0.075*** 0.020 
loc1 −5.351*** 0.404 −1.438*** 0.056 −5.296*** 0.396 −7.132*** 1.048 
loc2 −1.766*** 0.042 −5.110*** 0.167 −1.765*** 0.043 −1.790*** 0.035 
q1 0   0   0   0   
q2 1.106*** 0.112 0.022 0.114 1.098*** 0.113 1.607*** 0.110 
Loans 21,310  21,310  21,310  21,310  
Obs 909,035  909,035  909,035  909,035  
Loglike −76,867  −76,544  −76,862  −77,269  
* indicates significance at 90 %, ** indicates significance at 95 %, and *** indicates significance at 
99 %. loc1 and loc2 are shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation 
parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled 
to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction terms) are 
scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. These specifications are jointly estimated with prepayment (results 
not shown) 
Conclusions 
In the wake of the recent economic crisis, many government programs have been designed specifically to help 
homeowners avoid foreclosures. They include the Emergency Homeowners' Loan Program run by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Hardest Hit Fund run by Department of Treasury and 
authorized under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The local unemployment situation 
inevitably becomes an important criterion when targeting resources to deal with the crisis. While the observed 
local unemployment rate is an important determinant of mortgage termination, we find that the long run or 
structural unemployment rate is a more important determinant of mortgage terminations. In contrast, short run 
or cyclical unemployment rates play a very small role. Therefore, policy interventions could be more effective if 
they target resources on locations with high structural unemployment. For example, as Figure 2 has shown, 
states like California and Michigan have suffered high levels of structural unemployment rate during the recent 
recession. Florida has suffered an increase in structural unemployment in many of its counties. These states 
were among the hardest hit in terms of mortgage default and foreclosures during the recent housing crisis. On 
the other hand, States like Texas have seen modest structural local unemployment compared to the rest of the 
nation during the recent crisis, and they have seen relatively modest level of mortgage delinquency. 
The way unemployment is measured matters. Default and prepayment probabilities are more responsive to 
changes in the long run (structural) local unemployment rate when measured with the HP filter than when 
measured by changes in the observed local unemployment rate. The probability of mortgage default is much 
higher for households in areas where structural unemployment is high. In contrast, when the BN procedure is 
used there is little differential impact. Future work needs to explore this issue further. 
We also find that the impacts of risk factors can vary significantly depending on the economic environment. For 
example, when structural unemployment rates are high, loans are more sensitive to the amount of equity in the 
home. In particular, homeowners are more likely to default when structural employment conditions are weak. 
This effect is not found for cyclical employment conditions. In terms of the incentives to refinance, when 
structural employment conditions are weak households are less responsive to declining interest rates. In 
addition, credit scores matter even more for both default and prepayment when structural unemployment is 
high. In short, while access to credit markets is greatly hampered by high rates of structural unemployment, the 
impact is softened for those with better credit histories. 
We find that expectations affect some mortgage outcomes. Expectations of higher lender foreclosure costs and 
longer free rent have no effect on serious delinquencies, but are associated with increased prepayments. One 
explanation is that the higher default costs may make the alternative option (prepayment) relatively less costly 
leading to more workouts and short sales. In contrast to the serious delinquency results, loans in states with 
longer foreclosure procedure are more likely to have short-term (30 days) delinquency than loans in more 
lender-friendly states. The reasons are not entirely clear in the literature. One explanation could be that these 
results may reflect the recognition by borrowers that there is plenty of time to cure a loan with a modest 
amount of delinquency in a state with a longer foreclosure time line. These results can shed some light on how 
borrowers may react to the lengthening of the foreclosure timeline for other reasons. For example, some 
lenders have imposed foreclosure moratoria due to legal concerns over the documentation used during the 
foreclosure process. 
In sum, this study provides empirical evidence of the link between long run or structural unemployment and 
mortgage termination through default and prepayment. The results indicate that if attempts to intervene in the 
labor market are to have meaningful impacts on mortgage markets, the intervention may be more effective if 
targeted to areas of high structural local unemployment. 
Notes 
1. It has been argued that the US unemployment rate is stationary (see Mocan 1999 for a review), especially 
given that it is bounded by definition. This study simply relies on the particular unit root test as the basis 
for examining different de-trending techniques. 
2. τ t and c t represent structural and cyclical component in both BN decomposition and HP filter. 
3. Applying a more elaborated routine to determine the ARMA process for each unemployment series may not 
be practical (for example, Clements et al. 2007 discuss forecast evaluations). 
4. The choice of smoothing parameter has little impact on empirical results. For example, when we set the 
smoothing parameter to 110,000, a roughly 10 percent change from 129,600 (while still within 
reasonable set up according to Ravn and Uhlig 2002) the change in structural component is too small. 
5. See Quercia et al. (2009) for a brief overview of the data. 
6. Following Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010), we standardize each variable to a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1 to aid convergence of the likelihood function. Because we are interested in the interaction 
of unemployment with other risk determinants, we normalize unemployment variables to a mean of 4.5 
(and standard deviation 1). 
7. This is done to control for possible endogenous mortgage interest rate on current mortgage. 
8. “Distressed” prepayments are loans that are paid off early or refinanced because the borrower is under 
financial stress. For example, these prepayments could include a cash-out feature that is used for 
consumption or to pay off other outstanding debt obligations. 
9. Decomposition usually implies that the average of the structural components of unemployment rates are 
supposed to be very close to the average of the level while the average of the cyclical components tends 
to zero. 
10. Baseline specification results are included in the working paper. Results not included in the final paper are 
available upon request. 
11. Controlling both cyclical and structural components in the same models requires interpretation of the 
changing one holding the other constant. For simulation purposes, we include these components in 
separate regressions and allow each component moving freely. When estimated together, cyclical 
components are largely insignificant other than the prepayment results for HP cyclical component. For 
example, when estimated jointly with respective structural components, the cyclical component point 
estimates of default for HP is −0.01 (insignificant), of default for BN is −0.01 (insignificant), and of 
prepayment for BN is −0.005 (insignificant). Those results are similar with results including expectations 
presented later. 
12. Although individual mortgage defaults are very unlikely to affect unemployment rates, it is true that the 
typical macro-economic variables used in a default and prepayment specification are jointly determined 
in the overall economic and financial markets. To partially control for this we include specifications that 
include the direct impact of the variable and it’s interaction with the unemployment rate (observed, 
cyclical and structural). 
13. Additional specifications used the expected change in cltv and the results are very similar (robust). 
14. HPI series are either I(0) or I(1) for all cities and each forecasting rule is based on an ARMA process selected 
by information criteria. 
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